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In 1899, at the end of a decade blighted by severe drought and econom-
ic hardship, J. E. Payne, superintendent of the Agricultural Experiment 
Station at Cheyenne Wells, made a fact-l nding tour of the surrounding 
plains of eastern Colorado. Payne, a recent graduate of Kansas Agricul-
tural College in Manhattan, drove his spring wagon across thirteen hun-
dred dusty miles of Kit Carson County and what was then Arapahoe 
County, and is now Yuma and Washington Counties. He interviewed 
settlers, located the few orchards that had survived the drought, noted 
the small-scale well and ditch irrigation, and assessed agricultural pros-
pects. Everywhere he traveled, he saw the ruins of towns and an emptied-
out countryside.1
 The semiarid shortgrass plains of eastern Colorado and adjacent south-
western Nebraska and western Kansas, which had been used as open 
range by cattlemen and sheepherders for decades and as hunting grounds 
by Native Americans for thousands of years, was rapidly and thickly set-
tled by American farmers, speculators, and town builders from 1885 to 
1889. This was (and is), at best, marginal farming land, with annual pre-
cipitation totaling less than l fteen inches, and in many years much less 
than that. It is an austere country of m at uplands reaching to distant ho-
rizons, with few trees, and streams that run dry for most of the year, a 




 But the settlers were not deterred: for decades they had been assured by 
scholars, railroad companies, agricultural journals, and state immigration 
boards that rainfall would increase as farmers planted trees, which would 
still the hot winds and reduce evaporation, while at the same time return-
ing moisture to the atmosphere through transpiration, causing saturation, 
and more rain. More plausibly, but still to a degree a fantasy, plowing up 
the dense prairie sod would allow rainfall to penetrate deeply, so avoid-
ing rapid run-off and evaporation. The stored moisture would be avail-
able for the settlers’ crops of wheat and corn and would again be slow-
ly returned to the atmosphere, causing more rain. It was only a matter of 
time, it was reasoned — and widely believed — before the semiarid west-
ern plains would be fully farmed without any need for irrigation.2 The 
fact that this was the only remaining free, or cheap, land on the central 
Great Plains only made the apocryphal theories more enticing.
 In accordance with this theory, in the second half of the 1880s the 
plains of eastern Colorado and nearby Kansas and southwestern Nebras-
ka became known as the Rainbelt. This was not in the sense of a natural 
surplus of rain, the way that Cornbelt denotes a surplus of corn, but in the 
sense of a del cit just waiting to be corrected. The expectation was that 
rainfall would be increased through the farmers’ own efforts and the land 
would yield crops as abundantly as the more humid plains to the east. “If 
we don’t have a continuous deluge,” the Denver-based agricultural jour-
nal Field and Farm gushed in 1886, “we will at least have enough rain to 
get along comfortably.”3
 The settlers trickled into the Rainbelt before the railroads were in 
place, and m ooded in thereafter. The plains of western Kansas and south-
western Nebraska were fully settled by 1886, leaving new arrivals — the 
“Rainbelters” — to push into eastern Colorado during the last three years 
of the decade. Because the cattlemen, anticipating the land rush and the 
end of the open range, had already secured the valleys, the homesteaders 
were left with the vast uplands, and the dream that rainfall would come 
to them through their own actions.
 The settlers hardly had time to get established before drought and eco-
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nomic turmoil descended and, lacking roots and resources, they blew 
away like tumbleweeds. An entire layer of settlement was peeled off the 
land. Many counties lost more than one-third of their population from 
1890 to 1900; some lost as much as two-thirds. The 1890 U.S. census pop-
ulation density map had shown continuous settlement across the central 
Great Plains from the Missouri River to the Rocky Mountains; the 1900 
census map showed extensive areas of eastern Colorado designated once 
again as “unsettled.”4
 The evidence of abandonment was written on the landscape. Payne re-
called that eastern Colorado towns like Lansing, Cope, Arikaree City, 
Thurman, Linden, and Harrisburg had “all aspired to be large cities, 
county seats, and railroad centers.” But without a surrounding farm pop-
ulation to sustain their banks, businesses, and schools, by 1899 they had 
been reduced to virtual ghost towns. Payne observed that Lansing had 
“only four cellars to mark its site.” Idalia had done a little better, retaining 
“two stores, two blacksmith shops, a school house, and a few dwellings.” 
At Friend, only one building, a school, was still standing. Cope had kept 
a store, a school, and a couple of houses. At Arikaree City, the one surviv-
ing building was home to a family of four. All that remained of Linden 
were “a few heaps of earth and a few holes in the ground.” There was still 
a family living at Harrisburg, and also at Thurman, a town that only re-
cently had been the site of two banks and had attracted the interest of two 
railroads. Payne drove eighteen miles between Cope and Linden, on the 
divide between the North Fork of the Republican and the Arikaree Riv-
ers, without seeing a single home.5 Over vast areas, the country was revert-
ing to open range, and the evidence of homesteading was being effaced.
 At about the same time that Payne was making his reconnaissance, 
Willard Johnson, a topographer and geologist with the U.S. Geological 
Survey, was mapping his way across the High Plains of Kansas and Col-
orado, clarifying the details of the subsurface reservoir of water that an-
other l eld geologist, Nelson Horatio Darten, had just named the Ogallala 
Aquifer. Johnson was also an astute observer of the human landscape and, 
like Payne, he saw that the area had been the scene of a disaster, an “al-
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most complete depopulation.” Johnson concluded that it had been “an ag-
ricultural experiment on a vast scale,” and it had ended in “total failure.”6
 The drama of the settlement failure was widely recognized. Frederick 
Jackson Turner, the preeminent western historian of the time (as it would 
turn out), called it the “l rst defeat” of the American farmer. Later, geog-
rapher Harlan Barrows embellished this epitaph, describing the settle-
ment collapse as the “l rst great crushing defeat of the American farmer.”7 
Coming as it did just after the U.S. Bureau of the Census had ofl cially 
(and prematurely) declared the frontier closed — “the unsettled area has 
been so broken into by isolated bodies of settlement that there can hard-
ly be said to be a frontier line” — the failure on the western High Plains 
in the 1890s had national, not just regional, implications. It was part of a 
wider “frontier anxiety,” the uneasy perception that the era of free land 
was at an end, and with it everything that had made the United States ex-
ceptional, from democracy to social stability. And, of course, it was Turn-
er who codil ed all this in his famous 1893 paper, “The Signil cance of the 
Frontier in American History,” a celebration of the frontier as the “cruci-
ble” of Americanization, and a lament for its passing.8
 Yet the drought and associated settlement failure of the 1890s have been 
overshadowed by the scale, impact, and notoriety of the Dust Bowl of the 
1930s, which conl rmed the reputation of the Great Plains as America’s 
problem region. In the 1890s there was no Farm Security Administra-
tion to sponsor notable photographers to record the misery, as they did 
so vividly in the 1930s. There was no del ning novel like John Steinbeck’s 
Grapes of Wrath (1939), or l lm like Pare Lorentz’s The Plow That Broke 
the Plains (1936), to give the drought of the 1890s a mythical dimension. 
There were no panels of experts like the Great Plains Committee (1936) 
to study the conditions and recommend future actions. And there was 
no federal aid, no Works Progress Administration (wpa) to put people to 
work, no emergency cattle purchases, no payments to list the soil against 
the prevailing winds, or to retire land from production.9 State aid and 
charity notwithstanding, settlers in the 1890s were mainly left to sink or 
swim by themselves. It’s easy to see how it could all be forgotten.
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 This book is an attempt to bring this period of American settlement 
and failure on the western Great Plains more fully into historical memo-
ry.10 The l rst chapter covers the distinctive geography of “frontier zones” 
and takes American settlement from the Missouri River in 1854 to the 
western High Plains of Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska in the mid-
1880s. This chapter provides a backdrop to what followed in the late 1880s 
and 1890s, serving to introduce aspects of the settlement process, such as 
migration patterns, demography, land laws, speculation, farming adjust-
ments, and persistent delusions that spurred on the westward movement. 
It also serves to show that continuity rather than change characterized the 
American settlement of the central Great Plains during the second half 
of the nineteenth century, even as the physical environment transitioned 
from almost humid to semiarid.
 The focus then falls, more locally and more personally, on the condi-
tions of pioneering in eastern Colorado and adjacent Kansas and Nebras-
ka from the height of the boom in the second half of the 1880s through 
the depths of the drought and depression of the mid-1890s. This focus is 
made possible by the existence of a singular historical source. From No-
vember of 1933 through the early months of 1934, the short-lived New 
Deal program, the Civil Works Administration (cwa), operating through 
the Colorado Historical Society, hired local people to conduct interviews 
with hundreds of elderly residents of eastern Colorado who recalled their 
experiences as settlers during the last decades of the nineteenth century. 
Eight counties on the High Plains of eastern Colorado — Yuma, Prow-
ers, Baca, Morgan, Kit Carson, Sedgwick, Logan, and Phillips — were 
included in the project. These interviews, which are much more compre-
hensive than the later wpa  interviews and only seem to have been con-
ducted in Colorado, tell the stories of these settlers, revealing who they 
were, where they came from, how they lived and shaped their landscapes, 
and how they viewed the entire experience in retrospect.11
 The format of the interviews varied from one county to another. B. B. 
Guthrie’s interviews in Kit Carson County, for example, seem to have 
had a template, because the responses covered similar themes, such as the 
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last buffalo, the search for water, the availability of reading material, and 
the establishment of schools and churches. Velma Hargrove, on the oth-
er hand, who conducted the interviews in Sedgwick County, and T. T. 
Kearns in Yuma County, allowed the old-timers to tell their stories in 
their own way and wrote them up more as narratives. For all the coun-
ties, to varying degrees, newspaper accounts, written reminiscences, bio-
graphical accounts, and local census data are interspersed among the in-
terviews. The interviews have yet another advantage as a historical source 
because the thousands of pages of record include the voices of almost as 
many women as men.
 Memory can be an unreliable source of historical evidence, because it 
is, by del nition, in the present, always on the tip of the tongue, and it 
comes with the knowledge of outcomes. The past it evokes is far behind, 
its image dimmed by the passage of time, and sometimes romanticized 
into something entirely new.12 Moreover, in this case specil cally, the el-
derly men and women who were interviewed in 1933–34 were not a rep-
resentative sample of the settlers. They persisted through the hard times 
of the 1890s, whereas many settlers, maybe most, gave up and left, their 
stories gone forever. But in combination, the cwa interviews constitute a 
collective memory of overlapping recollections. Together with other pri-
mary sources — land ofl ce records, federal and state census returns, the 
exceptional (though biased) Kansas State Board of Agriculture reports, 
settlers’ journals (especially that of the southwestern Nebraska settler 
George Washington Franklin), newspapers, accounts of such contempo-
raries as J. E. Payne and Willard Johnson, historical atlases and photo-
graphs, and much more — they help to vivify the past and make it possi-
ble to imagine what life was like during the last days of the Rainbelt on 
the western High Plains in the late nineteenth century.
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The Approach from the East, 1854–1885
orn
The word frontier has fallen into disuse, and for good reason. As used by Turner and other early western historians (and as wide-ly accepted by the general public), frontier connoted a trium-
phant and ordained American advance into an unimproved wilderness, 
whereas, to give an example, the Great Plains had been occupied and al-
tered by Indians for at least twelve thousand years. Moreover, those mil-
lennia had seen countless Indian frontiers of settlement, as when the La-
kotas (or Sioux) expanded westward into the northern Great Plains after 
1770, eventually displacing the resident Indians, the Crows, Cheyennes, 
and Pawnees. Frontier also stood for progress in American minds, a nec-
essary social evolution of (to use Turner’s words) “civilization over sav-
agery.” To some, it even accomplished the completion of the Creation by 
making “wilderness” productive and capable of supporting much larger 
populations than it had in the past. To the United States, this all justil ed 
expansion into an already settled land.1
 But if you shed what historians have called the “wrongheaded bag-
gage” of Turner’s provocative thesis — its nationalism, racism, and un-
substantiated theories (all a product of the age) — the idea of the frontier 
as a place and time, a zone of distinctive geography at the outer edge of 
American expansion, remains evocative and worthwhile.2
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Frontier Zones
Here, Great Plains frontier zones are identil ed as those areas of Amer-
ican (and European) settlement that had recently reached a population 
density of two persons per square mile. There’s nothing original about 
this: the measurement was also used by the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
on its colorful maps, and by Turner himself, to locate areas undergoing 
frontier development. Two persons per square mile (or section) indicat-
ed the beginnings of a farming population, of towns that provided them 
with goods and services, and railroads that connected them to markets. It 
meant too that counties were ofl cially organized and administered from 
a county seat (though their boundaries might be subject to adjustment), 
and that perhaps as much as 5 percent of the land was “improved” by 
cultivation. Beyond, generally to the west, cattlemen occupied the open 
range, and rapidly diminishing numbers of Indians struggled to hold on 
to their invaded homelands and beleaguered lives.3
 In these frontier zones, landscapes were initially distinctive because 
they were not yet squared-off by roads, or fenced to any degree, but 
open country crisscrossed by paths connecting farms to each other and 
to towns. There was little land under cultivation and, especially on the 
western Plains, a shortage of wood and water. Again, especially on the 
western Plains, there was tension between farmers and cattlemen, the 
latter objecting to the fencing of the range that they had previously used 
for free. The l rst, rudimentary generation of homes in the frontier zones 
were made of local materials, logs and sod, or just dug out of a hillside. 
The majority of settlers were poor, and many had no farming experience. 
Most of them were male, though not in great excess, and few were elder-
ly. There was heavy county debt, because counties borrowed lavishly to 
put in schools, roads, and courthouses, yet they had little revenue — land 
(as opposed to personal property) was not taxable until the provisions of 
the land laws had been met and titles, or patents, issued to owners. There 
were far too many towns, each competing for the farmers’ trade, or for a 
railroad, a land ofl ce, or county seat status. Most of the towns were des-
tined to fail. Speculation on rural lands and in the towns was rampant. 
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Most settlers were only on hand to make money on rising land values, 
which some did, and moved on. Others failed and moved on to try again 
somewhere else. These frontier zones were in constant motion, places of 
chronic impermanence.
 The frontier zones could not be occupied by Americans until the land 
was obtained from its owners, the Indians. Indian dispossession — long 
ago, way ahead of his time, geographer Carl O. Sauer called this the 
“dark obverse” of the gloril ed frontier — was, in effect, the l rst stage of 
the American settlement process. That history, which is l lled with trage-
dy, but also with the eventual triumph of survival, is not the focus of this 
account. Despite the conm icts, Indian resistance hardly slowed the Amer-
ican advance into the central Great Plains. The prevailing American phi-
losophy was bluntly expressed by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
Francis Walker, in his annual report in 1872: “The westward course of 
population is neither to be denied or delayed for the sake of all the Indi-
ans that ever called this country home. They must yield or perish.”4 They 
did both, and by the time settlers reached the Rainbelt in the late 1880s, 
Indians were as scarce as the bison they had depended upon.
 The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 had established American sovereign-
ty over the Great Plains, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 brought 
much of the vast area into the American territorial system. Plains Indi-
ans were legally recognized as the original occupants of the land, holding 
it by “Indian title” until negotiated away through treaties.5 This was ac-
complished quickly on the central Great Plains.
 By 1860 the farming Indians of southern Nebraska (Pawnees and 
Otoe-Missourias) and eastern Kansas (Kansa and Osages) had sold the 
bulk of their ancestral lands and were restricted to small reservations (l g. 
1). They were forced by their dire circumstances to sell. The previous 
half century of dislocation, famine, and recurring epidemic disease, all 
brought about by contact with Americans, had reduced their populations 
by more than one-half, leaving their lands as their only asset. The loss of 
entire generations of young people, who were vulnerable to smallpox be-
cause they had not gained immunity from surviving earlier epidemics, 
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was an inestimable tragedy. The loss of old people, because of deterio-
rating living conditions, left holes in the cultural memory, ceremonies no 
longer performed, knowledge no longer held. It was not a physical geno-
cide — the United States inoculated Indian children, beginning in the 
1830s — but it was a horror, and it lasted a long time.6
 When the eastern Nebraska and eastern Kansas reservations became 
encircled and coveted by settlers in the 1860s and 1870s, the village Indi-
ans were excised from their homes, and their place-based histories, and 
relocated south to Indian Territory (later Oklahoma). The Osages went 
l rst (1870), followed by the Kansa (1871), the once-mighty Pawnees (1873–
75), and l nally the Otoe-Missourias (1876 and 1881). Their former reser-
vations were immediately taken by settlers, and even more so by specula-
tors. The deep-rooted Indian presence in eastern Kansas and Nebraska 
never proved more than a temporary hindrance to the advancing waves 
of American settlement.7
 To the west, the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, who dominated the High 
1. Indian land cessions.
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Plains between the Platte and Arkansas Rivers, and, to the southwest and 
northwest, respectively, the powerful Comanches and Lakotas, mount-
ed a more serious resistance to their impending dispossession. As decen-
tralized bison hunters, living most of the year in small bands, they had 
been afm icted less by contagious disease than the village Indians in their 
crowded earth lodge settlements. Their horses (the Comanches had l ve 
to ten per capita by 1850) gave them mobility, the bison herds — still sub-
stantial in the 1860s — gave them sustenance, and their relative isolation 
from the advancing body of American settlement allowed them a twilight 
of independence.8
 But when the railroads breached that isolation, starting in the late 
1860s, and the bison herds were reduced to scattered bones whitening the 
prairie, the Indians’ future was foreclosed. The U.S. military, operating 
out of posts like Fort Dodge (1865), Fort Wallace (1865), and Fort Kearney 
(1863), which guarded l rst the overland trails, then the railroads, began to 
wage total war, attacking Indians in their winter camps when they were 
immobilized by women, children, and weakened horses. There were 
massacres, such as at Sand Creek, in southeastern Colorado on Novem-
ber 29, 1864, when Colonel John M. Chivington and his Colorado Third 
Volunteer Regiment attacked Black Kettle’s band of Southern Cheyennes 
and Arapahoes, leaving more than two hundred Indians, mostly women 
and children, dead. The clearing of the western Plains through warfare 
and forced removals to make room for another group of people l ts exact-
ly the del nition of what is now known as ethnic cleansing.9
 The area that would by the late 1880s be known as the Rainbelt was of-
l cially ceded from the Comanches, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes through 
a series of treaties in 1861 and 1865 (l g. 1). The Indians were settled on 
poorly del ned, parched reservations in western Indian Territory. This 
was the prelude to the most serious Indian reprisal against Americans 
on the central Plains, which took place in Kansas in the fall of 1878, and 
briem y slowed the westward surge of settlers.
 The Northern Cheyennes had been duped and coerced into leaving 
their homeland in Montana and settling with their estranged relatives, 
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the Southern Cheyennes and Arapahoes, on their reservation in Indian 
Territory. There were no bison left to hunt there, and the Indians lived on 
inadequate government rations in a state of near starvation. They were 
homesick, and malaria and other diseases ran rampant. By August 1878, 
two thousand of the reservation’s l ve thousand people were ill, and there 
was only one doctor, and no quinine, on hand. In response, Dull Knife 
and three hundred followers headed north through western Kansas on 
their way back home to Montana. As described later (1880) in a Senate re-
port, “their m ight was . . . converted into a running l ght,” leaving more 
than forty American men, women, and children dead, and more women 
raped. While condemning these “atrocities,” the Senate Report pointed 
to a failed American Indian policy as the ultimate cause of the conm ict.10
 The frontier was temporarily turned back, as settlers retraced their 
footsteps down the river valleys. But they quickly returned in even great-
er numbers. The clearing of the Indians through warfare, treaties, and 
disease was absolute. According to the 1885 state census, there wasn’t a 
single Indian remaining in western Kansas (nor a single Chinese, because 
the two peoples, equally disdained, were counted together as one group in 
the census).11 The central Great Plains between the Platte and Arkansas 
Rivers — the spearhead of the American frontier — was completely open 
for resettlement.
 The vacated land was quickly l lled with American and European set-
tlers. This rush into the central Plains contradicts Walter Prescott Webb’s 
thesis, presented in his classic study, The Great Plains, in 1931. Webb ar-
gued that settlers, used to wooded and well-watered environments, 
lacked the knowledge and means to handle the semiarid, largely treeless, 
High Plains to the west of the 98th meridian. In Webb’s interpretation, 
the frontier stalled for “the greater part of half a century” after the Civ-
il War at this “institutional fault.” Once adjustments were made — Webb 
stressed such innovations as barbed wire, windmills, and new laws for 
land and water — settlers were able to move across the 98th meridian and 
out onto the gently tilted tableland of the High Plains. Webb’s thesis, like 
Turner’s, had staying power: in 1954, sociologist Carl Kraenzel, in his 
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Great Plains in Transition, made the same case for a cultural fault line and 
a stationary frontier.12
 But settlers did not halt, perplexed, at the 98th meridian on the cen-
tral Great Plains. Instead, they rapidly advanced westward during years 
of ample precipitation and prosperous economy, only to fall back or else 
scatter elsewhere when the rains stopped falling and the nation descend-
ed into economic chaos. It was a pulsation, or more accurately, an arrhyth-
mia, marked by sudden rapid movements and periods of hiatus. In this 
cycle of boom and bust it was not unusual for areas to be settled by three 
or more waves of homesteaders before successful farming took root.
 Using the criterion of county population densities of two persons per 
square mile, four periods and zones of frontier settlement can be identi-
l ed on the central Great Plains (l g. 2).13 In the l rst period, from 1854 to 
1865, settlement was slowed by the Civil War and its violent prelude, the 
struggle between pro-slavery and anti-slavery forces in “Bleeding Kan-
sas.” Also, with few miles of railroad in place, and with no navigable riv-
2. Frontier zones.
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ers extending west into the Plains, settlers were tied to the Missouri Riv-
er, their only connection to markets and supplies.
 The pace of settlement accelerated after 1865 in years of good rainfall 
and rapid railroad construction. Settlers followed the river valleys and 
the railroads out beyond Webb’s iconic 98th meridian. This was down 
the rainfall gradient, past the twenty-inch isohyet; but no matter, because 
settlers were assured by scholars and boosters that precipitation would in-
crease as they planted trees and turned over the soil. The boom came to 
an abrupt halt in 1873–74 with drought, locust infestations, and l nancial 
crisis.
 The advance continued after 1874, as years of high rainfall washed 
away the memories of hard times. There was the promise again of a ver-
dant garden to the west where settlers would produce their own climate. 
“It was almost miraculous,” wrote agricultural historian Gilbert Fite, 
“how a few good rains could change the attitude and outlook of a people 
in an entire region.”14 Settlers accompanied the proliferating railroads out 
beyond the 100th meridian, until by 1885 only a band of counties in west-
ern Kansas and Nebraska and in eastern Colorado had population densi-
ties of less than two persons per square mile (l g. 2).
 These counties were deluged by settlers in the l nal nineteenth-centu-
ry boom from 1886–89. Settlers located on the uplands, conl dent that 
wheat would m ourish in the ameliorating climate of the Rainbelt. They 
endured severe droughts in 1887 and 1890, then again from 1893–96, 
which also coincided with a deep regional, national, and international 
economic depression. The settlers kept planting, even after their crops 
withered in the l elds, hoping to recoup their losses in one bountiful har-
vest. Then they, and the towns dependent on them, failed, leaving the 
haunted landscapes that Payne and Johnson encountered on their surveys 
in the late nineteenth century.
Midwest Extended, 1854–1865
The settlers who l ltered into Kansas and Nebraska Territories after May 
30, 1854, (and a good number who had crossed the Missouri River be-
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forehand and squatted on Indian lands) were drawn mainly from a wide 
belt in the midsection of the United States, reaching from New York and 
Pennsylvania to Iowa and Missouri. Ohio was the main state of origin 
for both territories. It was essentially a latitudinal migration, an orien-
tation that would not change even as settlers moved four hundred miles 
west across the Plains during the following three decades, though western 
parts of the belt, such as Iowa and eastern Nebraska and Kansas, would 
become relatively more important source areas.15
 In 1860 foreign-born immigrants comprised 22 percent of Nebraska’s 
total population of 28,826 and 12 percent of Kansas’ total of 107,204. In 
both areas, the foreign-born component was drawn mainly from Germa-
ny, Ireland, and England. Again, this was a pattern repeated in the Rain-
belt thirty years later, both in terms of percent of total population and in 
their origins (though there was a lot of local variation). The early foreign-
born population tended to concentrate in the burgeoning cities of the Mis-
souri Valley (Omaha and Kansas City, Missouri, were both stamped by 
their Irish and German presence), or else they migrated to the western 
edge of the frontier, where they often settled in ethnic blocks.16
 The settlers came into Kansas and Nebraska by water, either by steam-
boat from St. Louis or St. Joseph (which had the immense advantage, af-
ter 1859, of being linked to the east by the Hannibal and St. Joseph Rail-
road, the l rst line to reach the Missouri Valley), or by ferry across the 
river from Iowa and Missouri. As railroads approached from the east af-
ter the Civil War, settlers increasingly bypassed the Missouri River route 
and traveled overland from the railheads to throng the ferries. The ferries 
in turn would be supplanted in the late 1860s and early 1870s by the l rst 
bridges across the Missouri River.
 Some of the settlers kept going west from Omaha and Nebraska 
City on rutted wagon roads that paralleled the Platte on the m at terrac-
es above the river. Others moved up the Big Blue River valley from Kan-
sas to strike the Platte and the main overland trail at Fort Kearney. In the 
spring of 1856, for example, one Nebraska reporter marveled at the “line 
of emigrant wagons” that at any time could be seen “winding over the 
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hills to the west,” slicing through the Pawnees’ homeland, heading to Or-
egon or California.17
 Those who came to stay in Kansas and Nebraska (at least for a while, 
because most would soon move on) settled mainly in the aspiring and 
competing towns along the Missouri. It was initially unclear which town, 
or towns, would capture the trade of the Great Plains and prosper, and 
which would be bypassed and condemned to stagnation. The competitors 
in Kansas and adjacent Missouri were Kansas City, Missouri (with a pop-
ulation of 4,418 in 1860), Independence (3,164), Atchison (2,616), Leaven-
worth (7,499), and the railhead of St. Joseph (8,932). In Nebraska, Oma-
ha (1,881) and Nebraska City (1,923) vied for control, and for a few years 
Council Bluffs, Iowa, (2,011) was also a contender.18
 The selection of Omaha/Council Bluffs and Kansas City, Kansas, as 
the eastern termini of the Union Pacil c Railroad in 1862, the accumu-
lating convergence at these points of connecting rail lines to the east, the 
commandeering of bridge construction across the Missouri River (com-
pleted at Kansas City in 1869 and Omaha in 1872), and the money and 
politics that lay behind all the above ensured that these two “Gateway 
Cities” would emerge as the main portals to the central Plains. By 1870 
with burgeoning trade, manufacturing, and population growth, Kansas 
City, Missouri (32,260), and Omaha (16,083) had left their erstwhile rivals 
behind.19
 The letters of Joseph Barker Jr., a young Englishman who represent-
ed his family’s considerable real estate interests in Omaha in the 1860s 
and 1870s, provide a glimpse of what life was like in these bustling river 
towns. By 1859 the Barkers had purchased hundreds of city lots, eighty-
four of them located in what would become Omaha’s central business 
district, as well as a 720-acre farm on the outskirts of town. They bought 
much of this land using discounted military land warrants. These were 
certil cates issued to veterans of various wars that could be exchanged for 
160 acres of land. After 1852 the certil cates were transferable, and they 
could be sold at one-third to one-half of their value and used by specula-
tors like the Barkers to amass large acreages.20
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 The Barkers also ran an import business, shipping knives and cloth 
from Shefl eld, England, where the family was based. Always on the 
alert for potential prol t, Joseph had his l nger on the fast-beating pulse of 
Omaha, and his letters home are l lled with ideas for enrichment in the 
m uid frontier economy.
 From its beginnings, following the platting of the site by the Council 
Bluffs and Nebraska Ferry Company in 1854, Omaha lived on long-dis-
tance trade. Joseph Barker characterized the city as “a major wholesale 
place for the Western Territories.” There was substantial business out-
l tting emigrants who were heading west along the Platte corridor, in-
cluding miners striking out for Colorado, gold having been discovered at 
Pikes Peak in 1858. Supplying the Montana mines via the Missouri be-
came a lucrative enterprise after 1862, although that trade was captured 
by Sioux City, Iowa, in 1868, when the Sioux City and Pacil c Railroad 
forged a more direct link to Chicago, increasingly the main control point 
for western development. (Barker understood this and took out a sub-
scription to the Chicago Tribune.) Outl tting the military for its mounting 
campaigns against the Lakotas also enriched Omaha, as did supplying 
reservation Indians with treaty goods such as food and clothing. Serving 
as the home base for the construction of the Union Pacil c was a boost to 
Omaha’s economy in many ways: by 1868 the Union Pacil c employed l ve 
thousand workers at its shops.21
 Omaha’s wharf — the “very heart” of the city, according to Bark-
er — bustled with activity. Piles of telegraph wire and iron rails and heaps 
of coal and grain lined the dock, where at any one time four or l ve steam-
boats were loading or unloading goods and passengers. Opportunities 
abounded: Barker claimed that “everyone he knew” had prospered from 
freighting, government contracts, and “war speculation.”22
 As was typical of the entire Great Plains frontier, there was always a 
large transient population of young men looking for work. The mobili-
ty of the population was frenetic: “People do not stay,” Barker wrote, “but 
they do come, keep the Hotells all crowded, spend money, and travel on.” 
In Sioux City, eighty miles to the north, only 36 percent of the men who 
Buy the Book
12 The Approach from the East, 1854–1885
were there in 1860 remained in 1870. Turnover amongst laborers and 
poor people was especially high, whereas teachers, doctors, and others 
with an investment in the town tended to stay.23
 Omaha’s landscape expressed its frontier condition. The streets were 
mired in mud in the spring. Most buildings were made of wood, and 
l res frequently consumed parts of the town. By the mid-1860s some 
brick buildings were under construction, but the expense of laying the 
foundations delayed the transition. The cost of living was high, whether 
for food, fuel, servants, or rent. There was a serious shortage of housing 
throughout the 1860s, brought about by speculators like Joseph Barker 
who were holding onto their underdeveloped properties until their val-
ues had climbed. Capitalizing on rising land values was a key component 
of the frontier process across the entire central Plains. It certainly worked 
for the Barkers, who became one of the richest families in Omaha.
 Beyond the Missouri River valley, with its competing towns, settlers ex-
tended westward along the Platte and Kansas River corridors. They lo-
cated at the junction of the wooded river valleys and the open prairies, 
with timber, shelter, and water below, and pasture above. They avoid-
ed wetlands, with their over-enriched soils and association with malaria. 
They grew corn, as their fathers had done in Iowa or Ohio, and they mar-
keted livestock “on the hoof,” driven to the river towns.24
 There were also thin extensions of rural settlement along all the small 
tributaries of the Missouri, but only in their lower reaches, because prox-
imity to the river was essential for supplies and markets. This was ex-
plained by a certain Charles Robinson in a letter written to a Lawrence, 
Kansas, paper in 1859. Robinson pointed out that the corn he grew near 
Lawrence was worth nothing forty miles away at the Missouri River be-
cause the transportation costs consumed all the potential prol t.25 Short-
age of timber, absence of bridges across small, deeply incised creeks, as 
well as opportunities to work in the river towns also kept settlers tied to 
the Missouri River valley.
 This was not an unfamiliar environment to settlers who had originated 
in the Midwest. Rainfall, at about thirty inches a year, was lower than to 
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the east, and droughts were more frequent, as settlers found out in the dry 
years of 1857 and 1859–60. But the drought hazard was far less than on 
the western Plains, and in most years crops m ourished in the ample rain-
fall of the growing season and in soils that were rich in organic matter.
 This was verdant tallgrass prairie country, with big bluestem on the 
lower slopes as high as a horse’s back, little bluestem farther up, and ev-
erywhere, from spring to fall, a profusion of m owering plants. Settlers 
would have recognized the valley trees too — cottonwood, bur oak, hick-
ory, willow, walnut, box elder, and many more — though the stands 
thinned to the west, leaving eventually only straggling cottonwoods and 
willows lining the rivers out onto the High Plains.26
 The prairie persisted for some time. It was arduous work to turn over 
the prairie sod, which was densely matted with rhizomes and roots, and 
land was only slowly put under crops. The woodlands, however, were 
quickly taken out. As soon as a vicinity had settlers, it also had a water-
driven sawmill, and demand for wood for buildings, fences, furniture, 
and fuel was constant.27 Obtaining wood remained a problem until the 
railroads and lumber corporations brought the Great Lakes forests with-
in reach, and even then there was the problem of cost. But, there again, 
this had been a problem in the Midwest too.
 Settlers had l ve options for staking a claim to a piece of land, options 
that were still available in the Rainbelt in 1890. The l rst option was cash, 
buying already-improved land at market price, which averaged about l ve 
dollars an acre around Omaha in 1860. Not many settlers had the where-
withal for this.
 Before January 1, 1863, when the Homestead Act went into effect, 
most settlers l led their claims under the Preemption Act of 1841. This 
act specil ed that heads of families (by del nition male, unless the man 
was inl rm or deceased) and single men and women over the age of twen-
ty-one who were citizens, or on their way to becoming citizens, were en-
titled to 160 acres of the public domain at the cost of $1.25 an acre. Set-
tlers were required to live on the land and improve it for twelve months, 
before swearing that they had followed the letter of the law, paying the 
Buy the Book
14 The Approach from the East, 1854–1885
two hundred dollars, and receiving a patent. Settlers could expedite the 
process by “commuting” the claim after six months, paying the two hun-
dred dollars, and obtaining the title. The attraction of this was that once 
they owned the land, they could use it as collateral and take out loans to 
invest in machinery and other possessions. Many settlers l led preemp-
tion claims by prior arrangement with speculators, with the idea that 
they would sell them back as soon as they were commuted, or if they 
were “relinquished” at any time before l nal proof. In this manner, spec-
ulators amassed large acreages to sell at a prol t at a later date. The Pre-
emption Act was so riddled by speculation opportunities that it was re-
pealed in 1891.28
 The other common method of obtaining land before 1863 was through 
military bounty land warrants, those discounted and transferable certif-
icates that Joseph Barker used to build his real estate empire in Omaha. 
Like preemptions — even more so, in fact — military bounty land war-
rants facilitated speculation rather than genuine settlement. They had no 
occupancy provision and they quickly passed into the hands of wealthy 
people like Barker, making them even richer.
 The Homestead Act introduced the era of virtually free (there was a 
small l ling fee) land for settlers. It gave each qualil ed adult (the stipula-
tions were similar to those of the Preemption Act) 160 acres, with the con-
dition that the land should be lived on and improved for l ve years. At that 
point, settlers l led for “l nal proof” at the local Land Ofl ce, witnesses at-
tested that the land had indeed been occupied and improved, the applica-
tion was announced in a neighborhood newspaper for anyone to contest, 
and, after all this, if the application was approved, settlers received their 
quarter-sections at no cost. As with the Preemption Act, there was am-
ple opportunity for petty speculation. Residency requirements were not 
taken seriously, and homesteads could also be commuted for two hun-
dred dollars after six months, or relinquished by prior arrangement with 
a speculator waiting in the wings. Still, the Homestead Act was less sub-
ject to abuse than preemptions and military bounty land warrants, and 
many were gratefully taken by aspiring farmers.29
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 The year 1863 also saw the passage, on June 2, of the Morrill Act, 
which gave every state thirty thousand acres for each senator and repre-
sentative they sent to Congress. The sale of these lands would l nance the 
establishment of land grant colleges. States could either receive the actu-
al land, or “agricultural college scrip,” which like military warrants were 
certil cates that could be sold on the open market. Again, speculators col-
lected the scrip, paying about l fty cents an acre, and used it to accumu-
late real estate. In 1868, for example, Joseph Barker acquired a thousand 
acres along the lower Elkhorn River, just to the west of Omaha, by using 
purchased agricultural college scrip. As he coyly wrote to his brother in 
Shefl eld, “It cannot be a bad speculation.”30
 Just as Barker’s letters provide insights into urban life on this early 
Plains frontier, so the reminiscences of Even Jefferson Jenkins shed light 
on living conditions in the rural areas.31 Jenkins was a lawyer who, in the 
absence of such work, was reduced to cutting wood for steamboats in Do-
niphan County, in extreme northeastern Kansas, in the 1860s. Jenkins’s 
account, written a decade later during slack times in his work as a land 
ofl ce agent, evokes “rare scenes of rural loveliness,” a lush environment 
cloaked with valley woodlands and teeming with small game — wild tur-
keys, pheasants, quail, ducks, geese, and grouse — though the sawmills 
quickly devoured the trees, and the game was rapidly depleted by hunt-
ing. Jenkins also made note of the early evidence of human failure: at least 
l fteen townsites stood deserted along the Missouri River in Doniphan 
County, speculations gone wrong, or, in Jenkins’s words, “relics of lost 
opportunities for greatness.” The surviving “embryo cities” competed for 
the trade of the incoming settlers.
 These settlers, as Jenkins described them, had been landless in their 
former states of Illinois, Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Michigan, and 
they were attracted by the free or cheap land in Kansas. They pushed 
west in covered wagons across the northern tier of Kansas counties from 
Doniphan to Marshall. Each wagon brimmed with furniture, bedding, 
and children. Typically, a dilapidated chicken coop was attached to the 
back of the wagon, with the heads of poultry comically protruding. Be-
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hind the wagons trailed cows and calves, with a “house dog” bringing up 
the rear. When a family found a suitable place, they laid a foundation of 
four logs as a base for a cabin (and proof that the land was taken), then 
headed to the land ofl ce to l le a claim. The families slept in their wag-
ons and prepared their meals over an open l re until a rudimentary l rst 
home, perhaps no more than a dugout, could be built.
 Jenkins characterized the settlers as poor, idealistic, and optimistic, 
and the same could be said about the Rainbelt settlers a generation lat-
er. “Their vision of a new country,” he wrote, “was magnil ed by imagi-
nary guideposts to the future.” They were motivated by the prospect of a 
home and land “unencumbered with debt and mortgage,” and they be-
lieved that this could be achieved with little labor. They soon found, how-
ever, that it took three yoke of oxen pulling a heavy iron plow to break the 
matted sod, and once the game was gone, meat became a luxury. Jenkins 
described how a single piece of pork would be rotated around a commu-
nity to give each family a little m avor to their beans. Though perhaps ro-
manticized, Jenkins maintained that everyone was equal and “mutually 
dependent” in this frontier setting. The “latch-strings of the cabin door 
hung on the outside,” he wrote, an open invitation to visit. Frederick Jack-
son Turner would have appreciated this conl rmation of the leveling, de-
mocratizing effect of the frontier.
 Jenkins had his own “imaginary guideposts to the future.” Like many 
of his contemporaries, he assumed that climate would improve as a re-
sult of settlement: “The hot winds and droughts that were observed be-
fore settlement are things of the past,” he claimed, adding, “settlement 
and cultivation, with tree planting, have removed the cause.” Turning 
over the soil, he explained, allowed rainfall to penetrate deeply, escape 
evaporation, and gradually replenish streams and springs. More dubious-
ly, Jenkins assumed that the cultivation of trees “contributes materially to 
the increase in rainfall.” Theories linking tree-planting to increased rain-
fall (and the opposite, linking deforestation to aridity) had held currency 
since ancient Greece.32 But on the western Great Plains in the late nine-
teenth century, almost as a matter of necessity, they hardened into convic-
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tions and persisted until eventually disproven in the 1890s by drought and 
widespread failure.
The First Boom, 1866–1874
With the railroads at hand, and beginning to extend west, and with the 
Civil War ended, settlers m owed into Nebraska and Kansas after 1865. In 
June of 1866, from his vantage point in Omaha, James Barker watched 
settlers “going out all along the Rail Road [Union Pacil c] onto the trib-
utaries of the Platt, Elk Horn, and other streams,” selecting their home-
steads and preemptions wherever there was woodland. Barker was par-
ticularly impressed by the “large numbers of Germans from Wisconsin 
with their sheep and goats” heading to the next free and cheap land. He 
explained that the market had now come to the settlers: “They now can 
sell all they raise out west, in the new towns along the tracks and to emi-
grants passing through.”33
 The Union Pacil c followed the Platte River to its fork, then extend-
ed due west into Wyoming in 1867, heading toward Utah and the golden 
spike that connected the l rst transcontinental railroad two years later. On 
its way it spawned a succession of “Hell on Wheels” towns at the railhead. 
These railhead towns briem y m ared, until the tracks moved on to another 
site. North Platte was such a town.
 North Platte was laid out in 1866, just in time for the arrival of the 
Union Pacil c construction crews. Within a month, three hundred ram-
shackle sod, log, and plank buildings, interspersed with many tents, had 
risen from the prairie, and l ve thousand people were on hand. Some 
were Omaha merchants who sold their goods and services to a cap-
tive market at successive railhead towns in a rolling economic bonanza. 
Most were railroad workers (graders, masons, surveyors, and track crew) 
and the gamblers, prostitutes, and other opportunists who fed off them. 
There were no churches, no schools, no l re department, and no city gov-
ernment. It was a situation repeated along all the main lines in Kansas 
and Nebraska in the late 1860s and 1870s.34
 But by June 1867, the tracks had been laid to Julesburg, Colorado, and 
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nearly all the people, most of the buildings, and the local newspaper, apt-
ly named Pioneer on Wheels, had moved on west. Under the more placid 
control of the “better element,” North Platte began to build a stable eco-
nomic base and a solid social foundation of schools, churches, and frater-
nal organizations.
 To the south, the Kansas branch of the Union Pacil c (after 1869, called 
the Kansas Pacil c) traced the Kansas River to Ellsworth, then angled 
southwest to reach the Colorado line in 1869, and Denver the follow-
ing year. The Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe got a later start (1868), but 
quickly extended beyond the settled area, following the Arkansas River 
into Colorado in 1872, then on to California (l g. 3).
 The rail network thickened in the east, with the Burlington and Mis-
souri connecting Plattsmouth to Kearney in 1872, the same year that the 
St. Joseph and Denver Railroad linked St. Joseph to Grand Island, both 
bringing south-central Nebraska within reach of homesteaders. The rail-
roads sped up the pace of settlement and allowed settlers to come more 
easily from afar. They bridged the distances across the Plains, opening up 
the region to commercial farming, and connecting it more tightly to the 
outside world, via the Missouri Valley gateway cities.
 The railroads also channeled investment directly to the frontier from 
the Missouri Valley towns. Omaha’s reach westward along the Union Pa-
cil c, for example, was extensive. In 1868, Barker and other Omaha busi-
ness leaders hosted “leading men” from St. Louis, Chicago, and New 
York on a “Special Train” to the Union Pacil c railhead west of Cheyenne, 
Wyoming, the objective being to show off the country and its resources. 
Barker characterized Cheyenne as a “little Town,” located in a “poor dry 
barren place,” and completely “run” by Omaha.”35
 All the railroads received construction subsidies from the federal gov-
ernment in the form of land grants, which gave settlers and speculators 
another option to acquire land. The details, though not the substance, 
of land disposal within the grants varied from one railroad to another. 
The Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe, for example, was given a belt of ten 
miles on either side of the tracks, about 3 million acres in all. The Union 
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Pacil c’s land grant was twenty miles on either side of tracks, amounting 
to 7 million acres. The Union Pacil c and Kansas Pacil c land grants ex-
tended all the way across Kansas and Nebraska and into Colorado and 
Wyoming respectively. The Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe land grant 
stopped at the Colorado line.36
 Within each land grant, the railroads were given the odd-numbered 
(square mile) sections. The railroads would supposedly pay back their 
government loans by selling these sections at prices that averaged about 
l ve dollars an acre (though, according to historian Paul Wallace Gates, 
the loans were never repaid in full). The railroads would also benel t, of 
course, from the increased trade that would ensue as the land was settled. 
Even-numbered sections in the land grants were subject to entry under 
the Preemption and Homestead Acts, but only in eighty-acre parcels, and 
at the cost of $2.50 an acre if preempted (or commuted). Settlers received 
less land and paid more in order to have access to transportation and con-
nection to markets.37
 In order to l ll their land grants and their boxcars, the railroads be-
came active recruiting agencies, dispatching representatives throughout 
the Midwest, the eastern United States, and western Europe. The Atchi-
son, Topeka, and Santa Fe was particularly energetic, establishing a land 
ofl ce in 1872 and hiring l ve hundred agents. Potential settlers could 
purchase discounted tickets to check out the railroad lands, and if they 
agreed to buy, the ticket price was deducted from the cost. It was clearly 
in the interest of the railroads, as well as the states, to broadcast a bucol-
ic image of western Nebraska and Kansas and eastern Colorado, and to 
stress that agricultural settlement led to climatic amelioration.38
 The belief that (as Jenkins had argued) rainfall increased with settle-
ment was widely held by the early 1870s. The commissioner of the Gen-
eral Land Ofl ce, in his 1868 report, urged the planting of trees on the 
Great Plains as a means of increasing rainfall. This had already happened 
in eastern Kansas, the commissioner explained, and there was no reason 
to believe that it would not also occur on the western Plains. In the ab-
sence of reliable climate records (the l rst widespread systematic measure-
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ments of rainfall and temperature were not made until the late 1880s), 
this theory seemed reasonable.39 It was also a seductive proposition, a con-
venient recruiting device for the railroads, a common self-congratulato-
ry theme in each state’s agricultural journals, a career-building cause for 
various experts, and a handy delusion for settlers, who desperately want-
ed to believe that it was true.
 Samuel Aughey, Lutheran minister and professor of biology at the 
University of Nebraska, was particularly tireless in spreading the good 
news. In 1873, in an address to the Nebraska State Legislature, Aughey 
proclaimed: “As civilization extends westward the fall of rain increas-
es from year to year.” Aughey explained that the plow was the trigger of 
change, the cultivated earth serving as a sponge that absorbed the mois-
ture, then released it slowly. Planting trees was also instrumental in the 
annual increase in Nebraska’s rainfall over the previous twenty years, ac-
cording to Aughey. Aughey’s inm uence was pervasive: he inm uenced the 
state’s leading agricultural journal, Nebraska Farmer, to the extent that 
hardly an issue from 1878 to 1893 failed to refer to the imagined increas-
ing rainfall.40
 In Kansas, Richard Smith Elliott, industrial agent for the Kansas Pa-
cil c, was every bit as enthusiastic as Aughey. In the 1870s Elliott, who had 
previously been a farmer, inventor, newspaper editor, and Indian agent, 
energetically promoted the theory of increasing rainfall to justify rail-
road expansion. As historian David Emmons put it, in Elliott’s thinking 
“the railroads attracted the people, the people brought the rain, the rain 
attracted more people.” In his Industrial Resources of Western Kansas and 
Eastern Colorado (1871), Elliott expressed his conl dence that a “perma-
nent and benel cial change of climate” was moving west with settlement 
as the land was plowed and shaded by newly planted trees. This would 
reduce wind speed and evaporation, while at the same time accelerating 
the return of moisture to the atmosphere. Elliott maintained that blue-
grasses of the tallgrass prairie were colonizing westward into the short-
grass prairie. This “substitution of grasses,” he went on, was a result of 
increased rainfall brought about by the planting of trees. The tall grass-
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es in turn would add to the amelioration by diffusing the sun’s heat and 
reducing summer temperatures. Tree-planting was Elliott’s main argu-
ment, but he was ecumenical in embracing all possible causes: perhaps 
the increased rainfall was caused by the new iron rails and the “friction 
of metallic surfaces,” sending waves up into the atmosphere as the trains 
went through.41
 In his proselytizing, Elliott did his best to dispel the image of the Great 
American Desert, which clung to Kansas, especially, like a l lm of dust. 
Scholars have long argued that this unfavorable image of the Great Plains 
(a product of Zebulon Pike’s expedition in 1806 and Stephen Long’s in 
1820) was not widely believed in the West, but held mainly by educated 
classes in the East, who read the newspapers and geography textbooks 
that had adopted it.42 But the degree to which the desert image was con-
tested in the promotional literature suggests that it was a real handicap 
to overcome. Elliott said as much, that the “idea of a desert character of 
the whole western region held its place in the public mind with a sin-
gular tenacity.” But by 1873, through the settlers’ own deeds, the Great 
American Desert had been shown to be, in Elliott’s words, a “geograph-
ical delusion.”43
 Reassured by the prospect of increasing rainfall, settlers moved west 
along the Platte valley in Nebraska, which had been the main avenue 
of American expansion since the days of the Rocky Mountain fur trade 
in the 1820s and 1830s. By the early 1870s, settlers were also advancing 
up the Republican River valley, even without the presence of a railroad 
and despite periodic clashes with Cheyennes and Lakotas. The divide be-
tween the Platte and Republican remained in the hands of the cattlemen, 
and therefore sparsely populated. Frontier County, for example, had only 
two homesteaders in 1872, and no towns.
 To the south in Kansas, the frontier line slanted from northwest to 
southeast, from the 100th meridian at the Nebraska line, to east of the 
98th meridian at the boundary with Indian Territory (l g. 2). This orien-
tation rem ected the grain of the land, with the Solomon and Republican 
Rivers being particularly attractive routes of expansion. Settlement was 
Buy the Book
The Approach from the East, 1854–1885 23
slowed in southern Kansas by the large Osage Reservation, which wasn’t 
opened until after 1870, though squatters were there beforehand.
 The homesteaders planted corn as the sod crop as they would do two 
decades later in the Rainbelt. They cut the prairie with an axe, then fold-
ed the turf back over. They also grew spring wheat and potatoes; kept 
oxen, horses, and mules to pull their plows and binders; raised a few hogs 
and cattle; and planted orchards. As soon as they owned their land, they 
borrowed against it and bought the latest machinery. Labor was in short 
supply on the frontier; hence the need for labor-saving machines. As an 
unnamed writer in the Nation explained in 1868, the farmer borrowed 
because it was “immensely prol table” for him to do so; it was the way 
to expand the acreage under crops, the way to grow. But when the crops 
failed, or market prices plunged, the farmer was left only with his debt, 
and interest rates of 10 or 12 percent.44
 Settlers in the central Nebraska and Kansas frontier zone in the early 
1870s had one asset that the next generation to the west would not possess, 
namely the bison. Men went out west in hunting parties from November 
to April, when the frozen meat could be transported home. They could 
procure enough meat in a day to last a winter, and also make money sell-
ing bison bones (to be used as fertilizer) and hides (which were made into 
machine belts for industrial production). Much attention has been paid to 
the causes of the destruction of the great bison herds, from the effects of 
the long-established robe trade, to competition for forage with horses and 
cattle, to the spread of bovine diseases, to the so-called hunters on rail-
road excursions who shot the bison as they stood motionless on the prai-
rie. But the tens of thousands of settlers on the central Plains hunting for 
their daily food must have had a decisive impact as well.45
 The destruction was rapid. In Norton County in northwestern Kan-
sas, for example, there were still large herds of bison along the Solomon 
in 1873. They “remained plentiful” until 1875. By 1876, according to the 
Kansas State Board of Agriculture, they had “entirely disappeared.”46
 Beyond the valleys, on the extensive uplands, cattlemen used the open 
range at will. By the early 1870s Texas cattle l lled the range. Yearlings 
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and two-year-old steers were driven north each year after 1865 to railhead 
towns like Abilene and Ellsworth on the Kansas Pacil c; Dodge City on 
the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe; and Ogallala on the Union Pacil c. 
The cattle were either shipped directly to stockyards in Chicago, St. Lou-
is, and Kansas City, or else fattened on the range before being dispatched 
east as three- or four-year-olds.47
 Wherever cattlemen and homesteaders came into contact, there was 
trouble. Counties where homesteaders were in the majority voted for herd 
laws, obliging cattlemen to keep their stock out of the crops. “It was the 
only practical thing to do,” reported a correspondent from Phillips Coun-
ty, Kansas, because homesteaders lacked the timber to fence their l elds. 
This land-use conm ict was repeated to the west in the next few decades, 
but there was no doubt who would prevail. All the weight of the govern-
ment’s land laws favored the many homesteaders over the few cattlemen, 
who reluctantly withdrew to the west to avoid paying the taxes of orga-
nized farm country and to dispense with the need to conl ne their cattle.48
 Just as had been the case in eastern Nebraska and Kansas in the previ-
ous decade, the new frontier zone was a ferment of speculation and mo-
bility. Innumerable towns were founded as speculative ventures ahead of 
the rural settlement that would be needed to sustain them. They vied for 
choice locations, for railroad connections, for a land ofl ce, or county seat 
status. Far too many towns were established; most eventually failed, with 
the “inland towns” — those that never secured a railroad — going under 
l rst.
 The passage of the Timber Culture Act in 1873 gave settlers the op-
portunity for an extra free quarter-section and opened up new prospects 
for speculation. The purposes of the act were to get much-needed con-
struction timber on the Plains, and also, following the prevailing theo-
ries, to enhance the climate. The act required settlers to plant and nur-
ture forty acres of trees (later, in a concession to reality, reduced to ten) 
over a period of ten (later reduced to eight) years, before being eligible for 
title to 160 acres of free land. The settler could then wait another three 
years before applying for a patent. There was no residency requirement 
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and no problem if the settler already held a preemption claim, a home-
stead claim, or both.
 The act was an open invitation for speculators. Barely a quarter of the 
timber culture claims in Kansas and Nebraska were carried through to 
l nal patent. Settlers could use the 160 acres without paying taxes or rent, 
or being liable for debt on the land, for up to thirteen years, then relin-
quish it. It was not uncommon for a timber claim to be taken up and re-
linquished l ve or six times before the land was legally owned. This meant 
that extensive areas in newly settled counties lay unoccupied and unculti-
vated for many years. Like the Preemption Act, the Timber Culture Act 
was repealed in 1891 because of its manifest abuses, but for two decades 
timber claims were the preferred way of holding land without cost on the 
edge of the frontier.49
 Mobility, both geographical and occupational, remained a way of life 
on the outskirts of American settlement. The Kansas historian James 
Malin, who studied the Great Plains frontier in greater detail, and with 
deeper insights, than anyone, found that only 43 percent of the farmers 
in the central Kansas counties of Dickinson and Saline in 1865 were still 
there in 1870. Whether because of speculative intent, failure, or, indeed, 
success (they proved up, sold out, and moved on), few homesteaders stayed 
put. Malin’s studies led him to believe that settlers who intended to invest 
a lifetime in a place were “virtually non-existent.”50 This was only a small 
exaggeration.
 Even Jefferson Jenkins, the woodcutting lawyer from Doniphan Coun-
ty, observed this frontier process from the inside. In 1870 he became the 
receiver at a new land ofl ce at Concordia, Kansas, a three-cabin town on 
the Republican River in Cloud County. This was the headquarters for the 
Republican Land District, which had jurisdiction all the way to the Colo-
rado line.
 Jenkins found himself in the middle of a land rush. Thousands of set-
tlers, mainly from the Midwest and predominantly men, were moving 
up the Solomon and Republican River valleys, ahead of the railroads, but 
no doubt in anticipation of them. It was difl cult country to cross. Jen-
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kins himself, on his way to his new post, had to lead his horses one by one 
across a plank over an incised creek, then disassemble his wagon and car-
ry the pieces to the other side for reconstruction.
 The land office opened for business on January 16, 1871. Settlers 
thronged outside; one particularly determined man had sat with his hand 
on the doorknob all night long. Lawyers and land agents worked the 
crowd, selling previous relinquishments or setting up schemes for new 
ones. Jenkins recorded 180 homesteads and 180 preemptions on his l rst 
day on the job.
 When the initial rush subsided, Jenkins had time to ruminate about 
the myth of the Great American Desert. He recalled that in his school 
days, the Great Plains had been “laid down on the map as a desert waste.” 
But now, he proposed, with the land l lling up with settlers who were 
making their own climate, the Great American Desert had been exposed 
as a fraud. “It was a mystery to all,” Jenkins wrote, “how anyone could 
have believed in it.”51
 Then, in 1874, the Great American Desert staged a comeback, bring-
ing to an end the l rst Great Plains boom. The climate reversals began 
with the hard winter of 1871–72, which was the worst on record for Kan-
sas and Nebraska. The winter of 1873–74 was not much better. Tex-
as cattle, left to fend for themselves on the snow-covered range, died in 
immense numbers, adding a new layer of bleaching bones to the prai-
rie. This coincided with a deep national (and international) depression 
brought on in the United States by speculative railroad building, various 
economic reversals, and the collapse of Jay Cooke and Company, a major 
banking establishment. Land values and crop prices plummeted. Settlers 
on the frontier, with nothing to fall back on, were hit particularly hard.52
 The drought struck in July of 1874, following a warm, wet spring that 
had promised much for the crops. There was no rain for the rest of the 
very hot summer. Then, beginning in the middle of July, grasshoppers 
came down (to use the words of the Kansas State Board of Agriculture) 
“in numbers so immense as to hide the sun.”53
 The grasshoppers, or, more accurately, Rocky Mountain locusts, came 
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in from the northwest, riding the hot winds. The destruction was most 
severe in the far-western counties that had received their l rst settlers after 
1870. Just as the settlers’ corn was coming into ear, the hosts of grasshop-
pers descended and within minutes reduced the green l elds to “stumpy 
stalks.” In Norton County, Kansas, for example, the crops were “entire-
ly destroyed,” and three-quarters of the 750 settlers were declared “des-
titute.” To the south in Osborne County, corn, garden vegetables, fruit, 
hedges, and trees were eaten, and one-quarter of the settlers gave up and 
headed back to the “older states.” The abjectly poor stayed because they 
did not have the means to leave. Corn was also a “total failure” in Phillips 
County where, in the absence of feed, settlers were shooting their hogs. 
Reports from other western counties in Kansas and Nebraska repeated 
the same story of destruction, destitution, and out-migration. The degree 
of destruction decreased to the east, in part because the harvests there 
were substantially completed by the time the grasshoppers arrived in late 
August.
 Altogether, in twenty-four counties in western Kansas, 12,029 set-
tlers were classil ed by the state as destitute (from a total of 66,104). The 
State of Kansas raised seventy-three thousand dollars in bonds to pro-
vide wheat to see the settlers through the following winter and seed to get 
them started again in spring. But each county was left alone to approve 
additional bonds to aid the destitute, and almost all of them refused to do 
so because they were unwilling to tax themselves. “Few are able to pay 
their present taxes,” wrote the editor of the Jewell County Diamond. He 
added, “For the county to provide for the needy will put such a burden on 
it that many of our best citizens will leave rather than bear it.” The needy 
fell back on charity, swallowing their pride as they accepted U.S. Army 
surplus uniforms and gathered at railroad stations to receive the corn, 
m our, potatoes, coal, and clothing that were shipped in from the East.
 The Rocky Mountain locusts returned in 1875 and 1876 (and multi-
plied in place from the overwintering eggs and nymphs) but in decreas-
ing numbers. They would come back in subsequent dry years like Bibli-
cal plagues, until their extinction in about 1902.54 The rains returned too, 
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and by 1875 agricultural expansion and frontier population growth had 
resumed. Quickly, the disasters of 1874 were cast as an aberration, rather 
than a character trait. In a report to the State Board of Agriculture, J. A. 
Anderson, president of the Kansas State Agricultural College at Manhat-
tan, argued that it was the lack of a climate record that had made settlers 
overreact to the 1874 drought, because they assumed that this was the rule 
rather than a rare exception. On the contrary, he continued, the line of 
agriculture and increasing rainfall was extending west, and (again, these 
familiar words) the “Great American Desert Theory” was getting “very 
thin.”55 With optimism on the rebound, and with railroad construction 
recommencing as the economy improved in 1877, the stage was set for the 
next advance.
Onto the High Plains, 1875–1885
In this new boom, settlers moved west along the rivers and railroads, 
through the dissected country of the Plains border, and out onto the 
sprawling grasslands of the High Plains (l g. 4). The High Plains, reach-
ing from about the 100th meridian in Kansas and Nebraska into eastern 
Colorado (and north to South Dakota and south into the Texas Panhan-
dle), are the remnant of a depositional surface that once extended from the 
Rocky Mountains to the Missouri River. This wide apron of sand, grav-
el, silt, and clay was laid down over millions of years by streams carrying 
eroded material from the Rockies. The surface of the High Plains — ge-
ologist Nevin Fenneman, in his inm uential Physiography of the Western 
United States (1931), called it “a vast area of phenomenal m atness” — was 
resistant to erosion because of its thick carpet of tightly woven sod and 
the presence of a hard deposit of calcium carbonate called caprock, which 
lies between ten and thirty feet of the surface. Sustained erosion could 
only take place at the eastern and western edges of this plateau, as rivers 
lengthened headward, cutting into the exposed sides. Beneath the sur-
face, at varying depths, sits the reservoir of the Ogallala Aquifer, its water 
moving slowly to the east through the open sands and gravels, and emerg-
ing as springs along the sides of valleys where it encounters hard layers of 
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rock or impervious deposits of clay. These springs also produce erosion 
and dissection sapping back into the valley walls.56
 This is very different country from relatively humid and verdant east-
ern Nebraska and Kansas. Rainfall decreases to about twenty inches a 
year at the 100th meridian, and to a scant l fteen inches annually at the 
Colorado state line. Departures of more than 50 percent from average 
4. The High Plains. Source: Fenneman, Physiography of the Western United States, 6.
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can be expected in any year; droughts are more frequent and more se-
vere. Moreover, rainfall is localized, often delivered in torrential thunder-
storms, so that one farmer’s good fortune is another farmer’s failure. On 
the m at interm uves, surface water is absent except for numerous shallow 
depressions, which hold only ephemeral water after a snowmelt or down-
pour. Creeks run dry in the summer, or, at least, run silently beneath their 
sandy beds. Beyond the main river valleys, the country encountered by 
the settlers was treeless, a level shortgrass prairie upland extending to the 
distant rim of the horizon, hanging low in the sky (l g.5).
 The Kansas State Board of Agriculture, ever an unabashed booster 
for the state, claimed in its 1886 report that the drought of that year was 
the l rst serious one since 1874. The report characterized the period from 
1875 to 1880 as an “uninterrupted success,” and while it conceded that the 
1881 harvest was “a little below expectations,” overall the years from 1880 
to 1885 were deemed to be an age of “general prosperity.”57 But, in truth, 
in the west at least, the rainfall over the decade was less reliable than re-
ported, and settlement ebbed and m owed accordingly.
 The second half of the 1870s was a time of at least adequate precipita-
tion. In 1876, there was a “large and well-distributed rainfall which re-
sulted in immense crops of wheat and corn” in all parts of Kansas. And 
5. The m at uplands. Source: Johnson, The High Plains and Their Utilization, 610.
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the 1878 growing season was “almost ideal,” with “record crops.” The in-
troduction into Marion County in 1874 (by Mennonites from southern 
Russia) of a winter-hardy and drought-withstanding winter wheat called 
Turkey Red, and its subsequent diffusion from farmer to farmer, was a 
successful adaptation of farming to the central Great Plains. An impres-
sive showing at Philadelphia’s Centennial Exposition in 1876 — according 
to reports, the Kansas Building, brimming with the agricultural bounty 
of the state, was the “best and largest” of all the displays — also drew fa-
vorable attention, and dispelled any lingering misapprehensions that this 
was the Great American Desert.58
 Many counties in the new frontier zone of western Kansas and south-
western Nebraska (l g. 2) experienced their l rst substantial burst of set-
tlement in the wet and productive years of 1877 and 1878 (although some 
had been briem y settled in the early 1870s, before the reversals of 1873–74). 
James Malin, writing about Edwards County (where he had been raised), 
noted that the l rst wave of settlers moved into the sandy country south of 
the Arkansas River in 1877. Trego County, to the northwest, was settled 
in a rush in 1877–78 that took all the available public lands. To the north-
west again, Hitchcock County, in southwestern Nebraska, was also the 
scene of a settlers’ land rush that drove the cattlemen from the area.59
 Then, beginning in September of 1879, the rains stopped, and the en-
tire frontier zone experienced a “drouth of unparalleled duration.” Much 
of Edwards County reverted to open range. In Trego County, crops were 
a “total failure” in 1880. The county seat, Wakeeney, which had been 
“jammed with people” in the spring of 1879, began emptying out, and 
was still “going downhill” in 1883. Hitchcock County was stripped of 
settlers in 1880 and 1881. The cattlemen came back, leaving one settler to 
ponder “whether or not the raising of grain will ever pay the settlers of 
the county.”60
 The situation reversed again in 1883–85, which were the wettest years 
on the short record. A new wave of settlers — in some places, by this time, 
the third — swept into the frontier zone. By 1885 only the western tiers 
of counties in Kansas and Nebraska and the counties of eastern Colora-
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do remained unorganized and had population densities of less than two 
persons a square mile (l g.2).
 The map of county population densities, however, hides the linearity of 
the settlement geography. In the far north, the Platte River valley was the 
axis of expansion, and North Platte, with a population of 2,540 in 1882, 
was the largest town in the entire frontier zone. Its numerous frame and 
brick buildings, and a courthouse that cost twenty-l ve thousand dollars, 
proclaimed success. Four hundred workers were employed in its massive 
railroad repair shops and spectacular forty-stall roundhouse. The town 
remained an important supply and shipment point for cattlemen and 
sheep herders who still ranged over the extensive unclaimed uplands to 
the north and south. And as the land ofl ce for Nebraska’s western land 
district, North Platte was also a mandatory stopover to register a home-
stead or buy a city lot and the last outl tting center for settlers fanning out 
into the surrounding countryside.61
 South of the Platte, the land climbs over steep eroded bluffs to a roll-
ing divide that extends for l fty to one hundred miles, before dropping 
in a series of terraces to the lush Republican River valley. Until 1883 this 
shortgrass prairie — prime grazing land because the buffalo and grama 
grasses cured as they dried and preserved their nutritional value over the 
winter — remained in the hands of the cattlemen and therefore thinly 
settled. Frontier County, in southwestern Nebraska, had only one town, 
Stockville, a crude assemblage of shacks, a single store, and about sixty 
people. Stockville served as a focal point for the cattlemen and a place to 
keep the county records (in a room at the back of the store). Gosper, the 
county to the east, had no towns at all, just a few isolated country stores 
and post ofl ces. Supplies had to be hauled from distant Plum Creek on 
the Union Pacil c.62
 The area’s geography was transformed from 1879 to 1882 as the Burl-
ington and Missouri Railroad was built along the north bank of the Re-
publican. Beginning in Bloomington in December 1879, the tracks were 
extended through Alma, Arapahoe, and Indianola in 1880; Culbertson 
in the fall of 1881; Benkelman in the spring of 1882; then on into Akron, 
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Colorado, and eventually Denver. The completion of the line not only 
connected places to the Missouri valley gateway towns (specil cally Platts-
mouth, the eastern terminus), but also opened up the Denver market for 
Republican valley farmers.
 The settlers kept pace with the railroad as it advanced, creating an 
unfurling landscape of farms and competing towns. After 1883 settlers 
moved up the north bank tributaries of the Republican, spilling out onto 
the uplands and forcing the cattlemen to seek more remote refuges to the 
west. Speculation by settlers and cattlemen alike, aimed at securing the 
water sources (and therefore the range between), was rife and evidenced 
by the preponderance of timber claims that were used to hold the land 
temporarily, until relinquished and reentered as preemptions or home-
steads. According to the General Land Ofl ce, one small creek running 
into the Republican near McCook was monopolized by a single cattle 
company from its source to its mouth. The company, whose owners were 
merchants in Culbertson, had paid its employees to enter claims all along 
the creek.63
 Town-building ventures proliferated along the Burlington and Mis-
souri tracks. The railroad designated a place for a town, then its afl liated 
Lincoln Land Company bought the site and sold the railroad a hundred-
foot-wide right-of-way through the prospective town for one dollar. The 
land company set about selling the business and residential lots, mainly 
to native-born Americans, who were preferred for the towns as opposed 
to Europeans, who were actively sought as rural settlers because, as John 
Hudson wrote, “They would work harder, complain less, and produce 
more than anyone else.” Townsites in the center of a county were partic-
ularly valued because that location increased the chances of being select-
ed as the county seat, a near-guarantee of long-term success. County seat 
rivalries often simmered for decades, as in Furnas County, where Beaver 
City and Arapahoe engaged in a competition that began in 1873 and was 
not decided (in Beaver City’s favor) until 1888.64
 The railroad towns of the Republican River valley, as elsewhere on 
the Great Plains, were spaced regularly along the tracks, about ten miles 
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apart, each controlling the trade of a section of the countryside. The form 
of the railroad towns (again, as elsewhere on the Plains) varied from the 
symmetrical, where the railroad bisected the town and divided the main 
street along its entire length (for example, Republican City, Harlan Coun-
ty), to the orthogonal, where the tracks crossed the town’s streets at an an-
gle, so that there was only one crossing of main street (Arapahoe, Furnas 
County), to the l nal iteration, the T-town, where the tracks were at the 
edge of the site, along with the standardized depot, grain elevator, and 
lumberyard, and the main street formed the stem of the T (as at Indianola 
and McCook in Red Willow County). Whatever the specil c morphology, 
the main streets, with their false storefronts looking like stage sets from a 
western, were crammed with businesses, general stores for sure, but also 
specialty shops, from boot makers to milliners. In 1883, for example, In-
dianola, with a population of 350, had l fty diverse businesses providing 
goods and services to its own piece of the countryside.65
 Settlers also moved south from the Republican valley into northern 
Kansas. The nearest railroad to the south was the Kansas Pacil c, sixty 
to eighty miles distant over a m at prairie that was cut into at intervals by 
broken land along the barely wooded creeks. The tracks of the Missouri 
Pacil c were laid along the Solomon River to Lenora, Norton County, in 
1882, but the company ran out of money and that’s as far as they got. In 
1885, as in 1872, only the Kansas Pacil c and the Atchison, Topeka, and 
Santa Fe crossed all the way into Colorado. All of southwestern Kansas 
below the Arkansas valley and far-northwestern Kansas above the Kan-
sas Pacil c, as well as much of the m at country in-between, was without a 
railroad, and, therefore, still in the hands of the cattlemen.
 The population origins in the northern two tiers of counties in west-
ern Kansas rem ect the proximity to Nebraska. For the most part, settlers 
there had not been born in Nebraska, but, for many, Nebraska had been 
their last place of residence. Decatur County, for example, was settled 
mainly by Americans who had been born in Iowa and Illinois, as well as 
elsewhere in Kansas. But Nebraska was second only to Iowa as their pre-
vious place of residence. The situation was similar in Sheridan County, 
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just to the south. But in counties three tiers down from the Nebraska line, 
the Nebraska contingent was much smaller. These counties were with-
in reach of the Kansas Pacil c, which channeled settlers west from Iowa, 
Illinois, Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania, as well as eastern Kansas. 
South again to the Arkansas valley and the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa 
Fe, and the isolated country beyond, and the Iowa and Nebraska compo-
nents of the population dwindled to insignil cance, to be replaced by set-
tlers who had been born in, or who had migrated from, Missouri and oth-
er parts of the upland South. These latitudinal alignments were extended 
after 1885 into the Rainbelt. African Americans, “exodusters” seeking a 
new Canaan, also moved out of the South after 1877, most famously to the 
town of Nicodemus in Graham County.66
 The foreign-born segment of the population was patchy in its distri-
bution, but it was generally less than 10 or 15 percent of the total in most 
western Kansas counties. Only in a few cases, such as Ellis County, where 
1,213 settlers had come directly from Russia by 1885, did foreign-born set-
tlers make up more than one-quarter of the total. At a local scale, howev-
er, in some townships along the Kansas Pacil c, which actively recruited 
Europeans for its land grant, more than one-half of the population was 
foreign-born. It has traditionally been held that foreign-born settlers were 
less mobile than native-born Americans, that, to use James Malin’s words, 
they “loved the soil for its own sake.” But one detailed study of three im-
migrant groups in central Kansas found no signil cant difference in pop-
ulation turnover.67
 The settlers moving into far-western Kansas and Nebraska after 1880 
continued to be encouraged by the persistent mythology, kept alive by di-
verse experts and railroad and state boosters, that they were changing the 
climate for the better. Although, as the climate record grew, there was an 
opposing school of thought that settlers should adapt to the semiarid en-
vironment, by growing drought-resistant sorghum, for example, the pre-
vailing theory was still that environment was adapting to the settlers.68
 Samuel Aughey remained an apostle of benel cial, human-induced 
climate change, writing in 1880 that “as pioneers take up government 
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lands and encroach on the Plains, the line of abundant rainfall also moves 
west.” It was only a matter of time, Aughey reasoned, before the “sufl -
ciently and increasingly moist region will encroach on the dry region un-
til it is entirely crowded out of the state.” Aughey now downplayed the 
role of tree planting, noting that rainfall increases had occurred before 
many trees had been planted. The agency was clearly, in Aughey’s mind, 
“the great increase in the absorptive power of the soil, wrought by culti-
vation.” Instead of running off the impervious prairie sod into creeks and 
rivers and away, rain penetrated the exposed cultivated soil, then slow-
ly returned moisture to the atmosphere until, saturated, it yielded more 
rain. “Anyone can see,” Aughey insisted, “that this must make an enor-
mous difference in the moisture of the atmosphere and on rainfall.”69
 Meanwhile, in Kansas, the other early evangelist of “Rainfall Follows 
the Plow,” Richard Elliott, had been l red by the Kansas Pacil c when 
the 1873–74 drought cast serious doubt on the credibility of his theories. 
But in both Kansas and Nebraska, railroad companies, agricultural pub-
lications, university professors, and local newspapers continued to pro-
mote the seductive theory. And always the Great American Desert was 
the blighted image to be countered. In 1883, for example, the Nebras-
ka State Gazetteer and Business Directory triumphantly reported that Ne-
braska had “changed its ancient character — under which it l gured so 
long — of the Great American Desert.”70
 Yet some commentaries in the Kansas State Board of Agriculture 
reports in the 1880s were becoming more reserved and reasoned than 
they had been previously, probably due to the irrefutable record of re-
cent droughts, as in 1873–74 and 1879–80. In the 1885–86 report, for 
example, state meteorologist J. T. Lovewell referred to the “general im-
pression” that Kansas was becoming wetter. But he cautioned that rain-
fall records had only recently been kept, and were “as yet inadequate to 
a complete answer.” Lovewell agreed that cultivated soil retained mois-
ture better than unturned prairie, and he offered as evidence formerly dry 
streambeds that now ran with water. What Lovewell was advocating was 
a more sustained use of the stored water in the soil; he made no claims of 
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an actual increase in the total amount. He also doubted that trees were 
contributing to increased rainfall, though he did acknowledge their local 
effects on microclimate.71
 Although the beguiling theories of increasing rainfall were not dealt 
a serious blow until the drought of the 1890s, Lovewell’s report at least 
subjected them to scrutiny and emphasized fact rather than fancy. The 
tree-planting version was becoming less persuasive, in part because so few 
trees were sprouting on speculative timber claims. And the plow theory 
was slowly being rel ned from the myth of increased rainfall to practical 
implications of preserving moisture in the soil, a transition that would 
produce the more rational, but still overblown, dryland farming cam-
paign of Hardy Webster Campbell after 1900.
 Still, geologist Willard Johnson, working through the Rainbelt in the 
late 1890s and talking with farmers who had managed to persist, was 
convinced that settlers did indeed believe that “extensive and persistent 
cultivation alone, by regulating evaporation, would bring them an equa-
ble and humid climate.” To believe this was almost a matter of necessity 
for poor people with few options in life: “The hope had its origin,” John-
son wrote, “in the pressing need for another ample expansion of the ag-
ricultural area.” In Johnson’s opinion, advertisement and promotion by 
railroad companies, town building companies, and agricultural organi-
zations “prolonged and swelled” the boom, but its main cause was the 
“exceptionally heavy rains” from 1883–85, which seemed to conl rm that 
rainfall was indeed increasing. Moreover, the fertile appearance of the 
land, which was covered with a “universal green” in spring, suggested a 
l ne soil for wheat. From the start, Johnson wrote, the success of the “agri-
cultural experiment” in the Rainbelt was “taken to be assured.”72 It would 
take a decade of adversity to persuade the settlers that they had been mis-
taken.
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